The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military service or government agency.

STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

ARMY PROGRAM BALANCE: DESIRABLE ATTRIBUTES IN A JOINT PROGRAMMATIC ENVIRONMENT

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL JAMES A. COGGIN United States Army

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A:

Approved for public release.

Distribution is unlimited

19960529 020

USAWC CLASS OF 1996



U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA 17013-5050

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military service or government agency.

ARMY PROGRAM BALANCE: DESIRABLE ATTRIBUTES IN A JOINT PROGRAMMATIC ENVIRONMENT

by

Lieutenant Colonel James A. Coggin United States Army

COL Ray E. Porter III
Project Adviser

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.

U.S. Army War College Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013

ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: James A. Coggin (LTC), USA

TITLE: Army Program Balance: Desirable

Attribute's in a Joint Programmatic Environment

FORMAT: Strategy Research Project

DATE: 12 March 1996 PAGES: 32 CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

The classic paradigm for U.S. Army program balance (force structure, modernization, readiness and sustainment) is challenged in the post-Cold War environment. The Army's inability to show the direct linkages of its program to the National Strategy, and do the hard trade-offs necessary to balance their program choices within the joint operational context, hinders its ability to justify its resourcing choices. Accordingly, Army program balance could be defined within the conceptual framework of Strategy-to-Tasks Resource Management (STRM) methodology whereby the Army leadership gets a fuller understanding of the implications of its resource choices.

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Figure	1	The Strategy-To-Tasks Resource Management (STRM) Joint Operational Framework9
Figure	2	The Foundational Concept for Army Program Balance Within the Joint Programmatic Environment12
Figure	3	The RAND STRM Framework Displayed In Accordance With The Demand-Integration-Supply Construct And Tailored For Army Program Balance Within The Joint Environment
Figure	4	Generic Concept For Accomplishing a Stated Joint Operational Mission15
Figure	5	Resourcing A Joint Operational Concept17

INTRODUCTION

The classic paradigm for U.S. Army program balance (force structure, modernization, readiness and sustainment) is challenged in the post-Cold War environment. Although the Army has strengthened its capabilities for unified operations considerably since passage of the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act, that job is not yet done. Further efforts by the Army to ensure the effectiveness of joint operations are essential to a successful and secure future. A transition in thinking is needed for the Army to adapt analytically to this evolving environment. This transition means senior Army leaders must think in terms of joint capabilities, rather than just Army systems, as our future Army is shaped.

Today, the Army thinks mainly in terms of Army systems and their contribution to Army capabilities. The Army Program Objective Memorandum (POM) presents the "Army's proposal for a balanced allocation of its resources within specified constraints." During the programming phase of PPBES, Army programming attempts to "integrate and balance centrally-managed programs..." The main objective of this process is to focus on the policy and priorities of the senior Army leadership while achieving balance among Army organizations, systems and functions.

Can this classic, inwardly focused methodology provide the proper analytical construct for shaping our future Army? John P.

White, in his May 1995 report to Congress entitled "Directions for Defense", said: "...DoD must do more to ensure its ability to conduct effective, unified military operations—the overarching goal of America's National Security Strategy...This means that the...(Army)...must focus (its) energies on supporting the unified Commanders in Chief who plan for and conduct our military operations as directed by (the NCAs)"6

The post-Cold War "disorder" has taken sufficient form for the Army to develop a strategy for coping with its new realities. Actually, the Army sought joint programmatic balance as early as the mid-1980's. "The Army's leadership strove for program balance not only with CinCs but also along their differing, competing perspectives." "It is time to complete the work begun by the Goldwater-Nichols Act by making joint thinking and acting a compelling reality throughout (the Army)."

The absence of national strategy to Army program linkages in the post-Cold War era has limited the identification and establishment of priorities for specific joint operational objectives and thereby precluded the attainment of a proper Army program balance for the new millennium. The Army's current concept for program balance lacks a taxonomy whereby Army programs are linked to joint operational tasks with clear linkage to national security and national military objectives. This missing nexus precludes a clarity of focus and contribution by Army capabilities toward unified military operations and national objectives. A more clearly defined, demonstrable and persuasive

linkage to joint operational objectives is needed. 10

Accordingly, Army program balance could be defined within the conceptual framework of Strategy-to-Tasks Resource Management (STRM) methodology whereby the Army leadership gets a fuller understanding of the implications of its resource decisions.

THE CONTEXT

"No analysts in history immediately comprehend the logic of their own situation in periods of transition; a long epoch of disorientation and confusion is usually necessary to learn the necessary rules of the new era.

Observers of the contemporary period of military transformation are no exception."11

Our Army is in the midst of four on-going revolutions which form the conditions within which we strive for program balance. We must respond to each revolution and the sum of them while seeking program balance or we risk not being relevant to the Nation's needs. These four major changes compel a fresh perspective on the concept of Army program balance. 12

Revolution 1 is change in the strategic environment. We have transitioned from a bipolar to a multi-polar world characterized by regional conflicts. The classic paradigms of a monolithic threat, global war and a strategic defense have become obsolete. In the past, these paradigms shaped the U.S. approach

to defense planning analytically. Unfortunately, they continue to do so. 13

We remain a world superpower. In President Clinton's January 1996 State of the Union Address, he said:

"We can't be everywhere. We can't do everything.

But where our interests and our values are at stake-and where we can make a difference--America must lead...

we can be (the world's) best peacemaker...if Congress
gives us the means to remain leaders for peace." 14

It appears our Army must be ready for employment in a variety of ways. In his recent guidance to the Services, Secretary of Defense Perry said that "readiness of the force is your first priority and you may trade off any other objective that I give you in order to achieve that readiness." Our national planning systems are adversely affected by this rapidity of change in the national security environment. Some observers persuasively assert that a defense planning void exists. The ultimate purpose of the Army, and the entire Defense Establishment, is securing the future for the American people. This is accomplished by producing the Defense Department's only real product: effective unified military operations. A balanced Army program should resource the best mix of Army capabilities to produce effective unified military operations.

Revolution 2 is change in the U.S. and world defense budgets. Defense outlays throughout the world are down approximately 45 percent. The U.S. defense budget has gone down

about 41 percent from \$400 billion (FY 88) to \$238 billion (FY98). The British Defense Ministry reports that as of this year (1996), their defense spending will be reduced to a 50-year low of 3.2 percent of GDP. Belgium has reduced its forces by 60 percent and, Germany, Britain and the Netherlands by 50 percent. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Shalikashvili, describes this as "a kind of free fall of forces" in some nations. 18

In the U.S., the DoD share of GDP is forecasted as 2.9 percent in 1999, the lowest since prior to World War II. U.S. defense is the only spending category to decline this decade. Meanwhile, contingency operations costs have grown in recent years from \$400 million to \$2 billion per year, a 500 percent increase. Base closures resulted in 22 percent of the 45 percent defense outlay decrement. With Army focus on structure, sustainability and readiness, procurement have taken the bulk of the remaining cut; procurement dropped from \$123 billion (FY 88) to \$33 billion (FY 95), a 70 percent decrement to a 50 year low. With this situation, Army modernization is suffering. 19

In sum, the American public "want and expect a well-trained and competent military capable of almost any requirement directed, but they don't want to pay a lot for it...The overarching issue is deficit control...It's going to be a tightfisted climate in terms of money, with more trade-offs than add-ons". A balanced Army program should be within established fiscal constraints by maximizing internal Army efficiencies and good business practices.

Revolution 3 is the change in "Jointness" prescribed in the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986. Since 1986, and with Presidential and Secretary of Defense oversight, the five Combatant CINCs have operated the military. Yet, our national planning systems retain the classic bureaucratic mechanisms employed during the Cold War. Defense planning and programming processes still focus on the Services to the detriment of joint capabilities. As the recent Commission of Roles and Missions points out, "...the role of the (Army) is to provide capabilities (forces organized, trained, and equipped to perform specific functions) to be employed by the combatant commander in the accomplishment of a mission."²¹

The Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) and the Joint Warfighting Capability Assessment (JWCA) process serve at the cutting edge of the "Jointness Revolution". The JROC role is expanding to support the Chairman's GNA duty to advise the SECDEF on requirements, programs and budgets. Warfighting requirements and capabilities are assessed across service lines. The focus is on joint warfighting and the identification of "change levers" in nine areas: strike, strategic mobility and its protection, deter/counter proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), land and littoral warfare, air superiority, command and control (C2)/information warfare, and regional engagement and presence.²²

Central to the JROC/JWCA process is the generation of a balanced "unified warfighting vision" for the defense program. This vision is emerging in terms of four principle attributes:

dominant battlespace awareness, fully integrated command and control (C2), seamless and robust intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) and precision weapons. This vision then serves as the standard against which service program balance is judged.²³ A balanced Army program should share the JWCA-based unified warfighting vision.

Revolution 4 is the "Revolution in Military Affairs". nature of warfare will continue to change in a revolutionary way. Within the next 3-5 years, we can expect to have the capability to see the battlefield 24 hours per day, in real-time, in all weather conditions. Technological "leaps" continue in ISR, and the ability to disseminate information across the battlefield. This allows the commander to dominate battlefield awareness and employ precision weapons with unprecedented effect.24 With these technological "leaps" in capability comes the opportunity to achieve economies of scale across service lines. For example, theater missile defense requirements identified by the four services may cost \$100 billion for 8-10 different systems. An integrated, cross service capability analysis based on a unified warfighting vision could determine only 4 systems are valid requirements and at significantly lower costs. "When you look at mission requirements in a joint way, the allocation of resources will be much more rational."25 A balanced Army program should optimize available cross-service economies of scale.

A STRATEGY-TO-TASKS RESOURCE MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK

RAND developed the Strategy-to-Tasks Resource Management (STRM) framework in the late 1980s as a decision support process for linking resources to the national security strategy within a hierarchy of linkages. The framework displays the downward linkage from national strategies to programs and tasks as well as the upward linkage from tasks back through strategies. This taxonomy supports the intent of the Goldwater-Nichols Act by representing the Combatant CINCs as the "demanders of resources" because they perform the joint operational tasks. Also, in conformance with the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the Army and other services and agencies are represented as "resource suppliers", providing service capabilities to the joint demanders. The integration of CINC "demand" (joint operational missions) and Army "supply" (warfighting capability) is performed by the Chairman and the Secretary of Defense. 27

Figure 1 is a schematic diagram of the current Strategy-to-Tasks Resource Management (STRM) Framework. Appendix A contains a complete discussion of this taxonomy. This is the same framework now being used by the Joint Staff for the JWCA analysis. It is also being used by a number of other DoD organizations during program development. The objectives and tasks identified in this framework are based on detailed RAND research involving the Joint Staff, the services and the CINCs on current articulation of the national security and national

military strategies.²⁸ A balanced Army program should use STRM methodology to see some of the macro and micro issues within a structured framework. This allows a hierarchical integration of Army resources with joint operational missions and tasks which support the national strategy.




Figure 1- The Strategy-To-Tasks Resource Management (STRM)
Joint Operational Framework

APPLICATION OF STRM FRAMEWORK TO ARMY PROGRAM BALANCE

This section adapts the RAND analytic approach derived from theories on good business management practices, and Strategy-To-Tasks Resource Management methodology to define Army program balance within a joint programmatic context whereby the Army leadership gets a fuller understanding of the implications of its resource choices.²⁹

The basic task inherent in defining Army program balance within a joint programmatic context is the *integration* of joint warfighting capability *demands* (which are linked with national strategy) and the *supply* of Army core competencies, functions and activities. During the integration process, trade-offs are generated, assessed and resource decisions are made which produce effective unified military capabilities. To successfully achieve this "joint" program balance, two decision-making criteria must be applied during the integration process: separability and independence.³⁰

The separability criterion requires that demand and supply decision responsibilities be kept separate within DoD.

Separability encourages both efficient supply and efficient demand. Resource integrators within a closed system, such as DoD, strive for balance between the resources demanded and the resources available. The decisionmaker selects from options and alternatives presented by the integrator to strike the elusive balance between supply and demand.³¹

Integration decisions must be independent; that is, the resource decisions made by the Army do not influence resource decisions made by other DoD entities. The independence criterion also applies within the Army. In Operations Research, the independence criterion is known as the Decomposition Theorem. This theorem asserts that an entire system problem may be decoupled into independent subsystem problems. Where independence exists, solving the subsystem problems will yield the correct overall system problem. This means that the aggregation of independent suboptimal operations is globally optimal. Also, with independence comes greater operational flexibility and responsiveness. 32

The Goldwater-Nichols Act defined the CINCs as joint military demanders because they perform the operational missions and tasks. The Army and other defense entities are the functional capability suppliers. The integrators are the OSD and Joint staffs in support of the SECDEF and Chairman decisionmakers. Within the Army "subsystem" of DoD, the integrators are the Army Secretariat and Army Staff in support of the Secretary of the Army and the Army Chief of Staff. Figure 2 shows the independence and separability criteria applied to a concept for Army program balance within the joint programmatic environment. A balanced Army program can be achieved by good analysis using the STRM framework and proper performance of the integration function.




Figure 2- The Foundational Concept for Army Program Balance Within a Joint Programmatic Environment

With this foundational concept in place, its relevance to the Army program balance within the STRM framework will be demonstrated. The RAND STRM framework may be displayed in accordance with the demand-integration-supply construct presented above (Figure 2). See also Figure 3, which is a hybrid of Figures 1 and 2.35

In Figure 3, the hierarchy of objectives-to-tasks and resources are linked from left to right across the top of the The demands, on the left-hand side of the display, are the joint warfighting mission capabilities required by the CINCs. The Army resources (supply), on the right-side of the display, are the Army's capabilities and functions. Between, at the level of joint operational missions and Army force elements, supply and demand are integrated. The Army needs to do the integration within its own STRM structure propose internal options that are relevant and responsive to joint operational missions. integration occurs as the Army leadership assesses and decides among alternative force trade-offs in support of joint warfighting capabilities. Collectively and as the process output, these decisions represent the optimal force mix of Army capabilities to contribute to our nation's joint warfigthing capability. The Army's integration effort is then "graded" at DoD-level by the JROC during the JWCA integration process. 36 A balanced Army program should possess the optimal force mix of Army capabilities which support joint capabilities and are justifiable to the Joint Staff, OSD and Congress.




Figure 3- The RAND STRM Framework Displayed In Accordance with The Demand-Integration-Supply Construct And Tailored For Army Program Balance In The Joint Environment

The "spine" of the framework is represented by Joint Operational Tasks. Army force elements accomplish, or contribute towards the accomplishment, of joint operational tasks while executing a joint operational concept.

As stated above, during integration the Army leadership assesses and decides among alternative capability trade-offs to provide a balanced set of capabilities that best supports the joint operational objectives and tasks. Generally, this process




Figure 4- Generic Concept For Accomplishing a Stated
Joint Operational Mission

occurs in the context of an operational concept. An operational concept envisions the synergy of various systems, organizations, and tactics needed to successfully accomplish a joint operational mission. Figure 4 is a schematic diagram of a

generic operational concept.37

The operational concept may be decoupled into five key functional elements: surveillance, assessment, battle control/dynamic control, mission preparation and mission execution. Surveillance assets obtain raw data on the object(s) of the mission and relay the data to assessment centers. centers turn raw data into information readily usable by control elements and sometimes operational units. Control centers assign the targets and may assist in directing warfighting capabilities to their targets. Operational units perform detailed mission planning as well as prepare and sustain force elements. Finally, dedicated force elements execute the mission; at times, dynamic control elements aid during execution. Normally, mission execution occurs in three phases: move to engagement, engage, and return to sustainment base. 38 A balanced Army program should resource the Army capabilities required to accomplish joint operational missions and tasks.

This concept for Army program balance emphasizes the need to resource a joint operational concept. Simply put, the Army should resource the "means" that fit the joint operational "ways" Army forces will fight in the future. In too many cases, the Army loses credibility with the Joint Staff, OSD and Congress when its resourcing choices pose "ways-means" disconnects when viewed in the joint capability context. This means that the totality of how joint operational missions are accomplished should be funded through capability packages. See Figure 5. A

capabilities package is a combination of joint functional elements that reflects the most efficient means of accomplishing a joint operational mission.³⁹ A balanced Army program should resource the Army capabilities required by validated and jointly agreed upon joint operational concepts.




Figure 5- Resourcing A Joint Operational Concept

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 40

The classic paradigm for U.S. Army program balance (force structure, modernization, readiness and sustainment) is challenged in the post-Cold War environment. The Army's inability to show the direct linkages of its program to the National Strategy, and do the hard trade-offs necessary to balance their program choices within the joint operational context, hinders its ability to justify its resourcing choices. Accordingly, Army program balance could be defined within the conceptual framework of Strategy-to-Tasks Resource Management (STRM) methodology whereby the Army leadership gets a fuller understanding of the implications of its resource choices.

The following specific recommendations are submitted:

- * A balanced Army program should resource the best mix of Army capabilities to produce effective unified military operations.
- * A balanced Army program should be within established fiscal constraints by maximizing internal Army efficiencies and good business practices.
- * A balanced Army program should share the JWCA-based unified warfighting vision.

- * A balanced Army program should optimize available crossservice economies of scale.
- * A balanced Army program should use STRM methodology to see some of the macro and micro issues within a structured framework. This allows a hierarchical integration of Army resources with joint operational missions and tasks which support the national strategy.
- * A balanced Army program can be achieved by good analysis using the STRM framework and proper performance of the integration function.
- * A balanced Army program should possess the optimal mix of Army capabilities which support joint capabilities and are justifiable to the Joint Staff, OSD and Congress.
- * A balanced Army program should resource the Army capabilities required to accomplish joint operational missions and tasks.
- * A balanced Army program should resource the Army capabilities required by validated and jointly agreed upon joint operational concepts.

APPENDIX A. STRATEGY-TO-TASKS RESOURCE MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK 41

Figure 1 is a look at the STRM analytic framework. At the highest levels of the hierarchy, we consider **national goals** (not seen on figure). The national goals form the basis for all U.S. statements regarding national security.

National security objectives include political, economic, military, and diplomatic objectives necessary to protect and defend the United States and its interests around the world. In contrast to national goals, national security objectives change in accordance with changes in the geopolitical environment.

National military objectives define what must be done to preserve and protect our fundamental principles, goals, and interests with respect to threats and challenges.

Joint operational missions are the activities assigned to or performed by CINCs to accomplish national security objectives and national military objectives. Operational missions can be decomposed into distinct elements that can be examined separately to assess the capability of force elements allocated to CINCs for achieving higher level objectives.

Joint operational tasks define various military strategies. They describe how forces will be used to support the national military objectives and define the military strategy for a particular region. A particular regional military strategy is defined within the framework of the national military strategy and from the Secretary's and Chairman's guidance. Functional

objectives indicate the support activities that must be present in order to sustain any military operation.

Military support functions are those activities on the supply side of the defense resource equation that underpin all operational missions. These functions are derived from law but are specified most clearly in DoD Directive 5100.1, Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components.

Military support tasks are the supply-side activities performed to accomplish military support functions. They decompose the broader functional assignments of DoD Directive 5100.1 into more manageable pieces for assessment. Like Joint Operational Tasks, they may be linked to more than one higher level objective.

Force elements are the sets of resources that are used to accomplish tasks. These can be standing Joint Task Forces with members form more than one service, or more traditional units such as Army or Marine battalions, Air Force squadrons, or Navy ships. The appropriate force elements to consider in assessing the capability of forces are determined by consideration of a concept of operations for accomplishing an operational mission.

Programs are the ultimate focus of resource decisions. The adequacy of funding and the timing of new force elements or systems entering the inventory can only be assessed by considering the missions that they support and the alternative programs that can provide capabilities that meet the same objectives. Programs are linked, through force elements, to both

the supply side and the demand side of our structure. For example, budgets are prepared by the services as a "supply-side" support function and include funding to support a specific number of units with a standard set of equipment. How the number of units meet national requirements requires linkage of programs up through the "demand-side" joint operational missions that those programs and units support. Consideration of both sides is necessary for program integration.

The following **national security objectives** were discerned from the Clinton administration's policy documents:

* Enhancing Our Security

- Maintaining a strong defense capability
- Deciding when and how to employ U.S. forces
- Combating the spread and use of WMD and missiles
- Arms control
- Peace operations
- Strong intelligence capabilities
- The environment

* Promoting Prosperity at Home

- Enhancing American competitiveness
- Partnership with business and labor
- Enhancing access to foreign markets
- Strengthening macroeconomic conditions
- Providing for energy security
- Promoting sustainable development abroad

* Promoting Democracy

* Regional Security Objectives

- Economic cooperation and democratization
 - -- Europe and Eurasia
 - -- East Asia and Pacific
 - -- The Western Hemisphere
 - -- Africa
 - -- The Middle East, Southwest and South Asia

The following national military objectives were drawn directly from the current national military strategy. The six military objectives are:

- * Dealing with major regional contingencies
- * Providing a credible overseas presence
- * Countering weapons of mass destruction
- * Contributing to multilateral peace operations
- * supporting counter-terrorism efforts and other national security objectives
 - * maintaining joint readiness

The list of joint operational missions provided below has evolved from examination of operational plans and military science by RAND analysts and military professionals. Alternative formulations are possible but this list of twenty operational missions captures all the operations envisioned in the national security and national military strategy.

- * Control WMD
- * Rapidly transport and sustain an overwhelming force
- * Control enemy ability to initiate and sustain combat

operations

- * Control land operations
- * Control maritime operations
- * Control air operations
- * Control space operations
- * Control information/intelligence operations
- * Conduct routine training operations in forward areas
- * Sustain forward deployed forces
- * Maintain prepositioned equipment and stocks
- * Deter hostile major powers from attacking with WMD
- * Prevent/deter/defeat attacks from other hostile nations with WMD
 - * Control ability to acquire, produce, or employ WMD
 - * Participate in traditional peace operations (Chap VI)
- * Participate in multinational peacekeeping operations (Chap VII)
 - * Support humanitarian activities
 - * Support counter-terrorism efforts
 - * Provide domestic military support
 - * Support other national missions

Joint operational tasks are not service specific. These tasks were iteratively identified by consulting published literature on the various military roles and missions and consulting with experts in the area of joint operations. Fortyeight joint operational tasks were identified along with many

sub-tasks. Some of the tasks are listed below:

- * Formulate concepts, doctrine, and requirements
- * Conduct joint exercises
- * Maintain stationed forces
- * Rapidly transport military forces and material into and within theater
 - * Evict enemy force from critical areas
- * Destroy/disrupt enemy information and intelligence operations

ENDNOTES

¹Paul K. Davis and Lou Finch, <u>Defense Planning for the Post-Cold War Era</u> (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1993), 23.

²Robert Holzer, "Pentagon Chiefs Get New Policy Weapon," <u>Defense News</u> (Jan 30-Feb 5, 1995): 1.

³U.S. Army War College, <u>Army Command, Leadership, and Management: Theory and Practice 1995-1996</u> (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army, 1995), 14-19.

⁴Ibid.

⁵Ibid., 14-11.

⁶Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces, <u>Directions for Defense</u> (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995), transmittal letter signed by John P. White, Chairman.

⁷James A. Coggin and John B. Nerger, "Funding the Sinews of War: the CinCs," <u>Armed Forces Journal International</u> (October, 1987): 98.

⁸Ibid., ES-9.

⁹Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr. and Thomas-Durell Young, <u>U.S. Department of Defense Strategic Planning: The Missing Nexus</u> (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1995), vii.

¹⁰Leslie Lewis, Katharine Webb, Roger Allen Brown and John Schrader, <u>The Unified Command Plan: An Assessment</u> (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1995), 60-66.

¹¹Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces, <u>Directions for Defense</u>, 1-7.

¹²COL William R. Jones, "Joint Requirements Oversight Council and the Joint Warfighting Capability Assessment Process", a briefing packet prepared by the Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment Directorate, J8, The Joint Staff, Washington, 31 May 1995), 1-25.

¹³Paul K. Davis and Lou Finch, <u>Defense Planning for the Post-Cold War Era</u>, 23.

14President William J. Clinton, "America Must Lead", State of

the Union Address Before Congress, 23 Jan 1996, quote taken from address as printed in the New York Times, 24 Jan 96, Al4.

Year 1996: An Analysis (Arlington, VA: Institute of Land Warfare, 1995), 8.

¹⁶Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr. and Thomas-Durell Young, <u>U.S.</u> <u>Department of Defense Strategic Planning: The Missing Nexus</u>, vii.

¹⁷Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces, <u>Directions for Defense</u>, conclusion page.

¹⁸Dennis S. Ippolito, <u>Blunting the Sword: Budget Policy and the Future of Defense</u> (Washington: National Defense University, 1994), 170.

¹⁹COL William R. Jones, "Joint Requirements Oversight Council and the Joint Warfighting Capability Assessment Process", 1-25.

²⁰Association of the United States Army, <u>Army Budget Fiscal</u> Year 1996: An Analysis, ix.

²¹Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces, <u>Directions for Defense</u>, 1-1.

²²COL William R. Jones, "Joint Requirements Oversight Council and the Joint Warfighting Capability Assessment Process", 1-25.

²³Ibid.

²⁴Ibid.

²⁵Robert Holzer and Stephen C. LeSueur, "Joint Chiefs Quietly Gather Up Reins of Power," <u>Army Times</u> (27 June 1994), as printed on page 184, Volume II, Course I Responsible Command, U.S. Army War College Selected Readings, AY 1996.

²⁶The first application of the STRM framework to a unified command was researched in 1991-1992. See <u>The United States</u> <u>Special Operations Command Resource Management Process: An Application of the Strategy-to-Tasks Framework</u> by Leslie Lewis, James A. Coggin and C. Robert Roll (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1994).

²⁷Leslie Lewis, Katharine Webb, Roger Allen Brown and John Schrader, <u>The Unified Command Plan: An Assessment</u>, 60.

28 Ibid.

29There are several RAND studies that outline these practices. See Leslie Lewis, Katharine Webb, Roger Allen Brown and John Schrader, The Unified Command Plan: An Assessment (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, PM-376-CRMAF, Feb 95); Leslie Lewis, C. Robert Roll, Ronald E. Sortor and Bernard Rostker, Organizational Analysis and Resource Management Planning: Annotated Briefing (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, N-3313-A, 1994); Lewis, Coggin, Roll, The United States Special Operations Command Resource Management Process: An Application of the Strategy-to-Tasks Framework (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, MR-445-A/SOCOM, 1994).

30Leslie Lewis, James A. Coggin, C. Robert Roll, <u>The United States Special Operations Command Resource Management Process:</u>
<u>An Application of the Strategy-to-Tasks Framework</u> (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, MR-445-A/SOCOM, 1994), 26.

³¹Leslie Lewis, Katharine Webb, Roger Allen Brown and John Schrader, <u>The Unified Command Plan: An Assessment</u> (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, PM-376-CRMAF, Feb 95), 19.

32 Ibid., 19-20. Also, for a more indepth treatment of separability and independence see Leslie Lewis, James A. Coggin, C. Robert Roll, <u>The United States Special Operations Command Resource Management Process: An Application of the Strategy-to-Tasks Framework</u> (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, MR-445-A/SOCOM, 1994), 26.

³³Congressman Bill Nichols, Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, Report of the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives, July 21, 1986 as described in Leslie Lewis, Katharine Webb, Roger Allen Brown and John Schrader, <u>The Unified Command Plan: An Assessment</u> (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, PM-376-CRMAF, Feb 95), 20.

³⁴This is an adaptation of Figure 2.1- Separability and Integration contained in Leslie Lewis, Katharine Webb, Roger Allen Brown and John Schrader, <u>The Unified Command Plan: An Assessment</u> (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, PM-376-CRMAF, Feb 95), 19.

³⁵Leslie Lewis, James A. Coggin, C. Robert Roll, <u>The United States Special Operations Command Resource Management Process:</u>
An Application of the <u>Strategy-to-Tasks Framework</u>, 26-28.

³⁶Arroyo Center-RAND, "Potential Army Strategic and Resource Issues", a briefing in support of Force XXI issues, 10 April 1995, 4-11.

³⁷Leslie Lewis, James A. Coggin, C. Robert Roll, <u>The United States Special Operations Command Resource Management Process: An Application of the Strategy-to-Tasks Framework</u>, 12.

38 Ibid., 11-12.

³⁹Ibid., 42-43. Valuable insight was gained on the nature of joint operational missions and tasks from discussions with LTC Gordon Bonham, XVIII Airborne Corps Director of Plans on 23 February, 1996, during my visit to Fort Bragg, North Carolina. LTC Bonham served as the JTF Planner for the planned invasion of Haiti and its subsequent permissive entry operations. His perspective on adaptive joint force packaging, as practiced during the Haiti operation, supports the concept of joint operational missions and tasks as presented in this paper.

⁴⁰The conclusions and recommendations section of this paper benefited significantly from the lucid and critical analysis of an earlier draft provided by Leslie Lewis of RAND's Washington, DC office. Her suggestions to improve the structure of my argument, the linkage of program balance with "jointness", and the articulation of the STRM application were invaluable.

⁴¹This is an extract of the current STRM Framework as described in <u>The Unified Command Plan: An Assessment</u> (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1995), 60-66 by Leslie Lewis, Katharine Webb, Roger Allen Brown and John Schrader.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Arroyo Center-RAND, "Potential Army Strategic and Resource Issues", a briefing in support of Force XXI issues, 10 April 1995.
- Association of the United States Army, <u>Army Budget Fiscal Year 1996: An Analysis</u> (Arlington, VA: Institute of Land Warfare, 1995).
- Banks, Howard, "Fewer Ships, More Microchips", <u>Forbes Magazine</u> (June 19, 1995).
- Clinton, President William J., "America Must Lead", State of the Union Address Before Congress, 23 Jan 1996, quote taken from address as printed in the New York Times, 24 Jan 96, A14.
- Clinton, President William J., <u>A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement</u> (Washington: The White House, February, 1995).
- Coggin, James A. and John B. Nerger, "Funding the Sinews of War: the CinCs," <u>Armed Forces Journal International</u> (October, 1987).
- Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces, <u>Directions</u>
 <u>for Defense</u> (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office,
 1995).
- Davis, Paul K. and Lou Finch, <u>Defense Planning for the Post-Cold</u>
 War Era (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1993).
- Holzer, Robert, "Pentagon Chiefs Get New Policy Weapon," <u>Defense</u> News (Jan 30-Feb 5, 1995).
- Holzer, Robert and Stephen C. LeSueur, "Joint Chiefs Quietly Gather Up Reins of Power," <u>Army Times</u> (27 June 1994), as printed on page 184, Volume II, Course I Responsible Command, U.S. Army War College Selected Readings, AY 1996.
- Ippolito, Dennis S., <u>Blunting the Sword: Budget Policy</u>
 <u>and the Future of Defense</u> (Washington: National Defense
 University, 1994).
- Jones, COL William R., "Joint Requirements Oversight Council and the Joint Warfighting Capability Assessment Process", a briefing packet prepared by the Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment Directorate, J8, The Joint Staff, Washington, 31 May 1995).

- Lewis, Leslie, James A. Coggin and C. Robert Roll, <u>The United States Special Operations Command Resource Management Process: An Application of the Strategy-to-Tasks Framework (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1994).</u>
- Lewis, Leslie, Katharine Webb, Roger Allen Brown and John Schrader, <u>The Unified Command Plan: An Assessment</u> (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1995), 60-66.
- Lewis, Leslie, C. Robert Roll, Ronald E. Sortor and Bernard Rostker, <u>Organizational Analysis and Resource Management Planning: Annotated Briefing</u> (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, N-3313-A, 1994).
- Lovelace, Douglas C., Jr. and Thomas-Durell Young, <u>U.S.</u>

 <u>Department of Defense Strategic Planning: The Missing Nexus</u>

 (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War

 College, 1995).
- Nichols, Congressman Bill, <u>Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986</u>, Report of the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives, July 21, 1986 as described in Leslie Lewis, Katharine Webb, Roger Allen Brown and John Schrader, <u>The Unified Command Plan: An Assessment</u> (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, PM-376-CRMAF, Feb 95), 20.
- Owens, William A., "The Emerging System of Systems", <u>Proceedings</u> (May 1995).
- Owens, William A., "JROC: Harnessing the Revolution in Military Affairs," <u>Joint Forces Quarterly</u> (Summer 1994) 55-57.
- Owens, William A., "The Jane's Interview", <u>Jane's Defence Weekly</u> (29 Jan 1994, Volume 21, Number 24) 32.
- Owens, William A., "The Jane's Interview", <u>Jane's Defence Weekly</u> (23 July 1994, Volume 22, Number 3) 32.
- Shalikashvili, General John M., <u>National Military Strategy of the United States of America: A Strategy of Flexible and Selective Engagement</u> (Washington: The Pentagon, 1995).
- U.S. Army War College, <u>Army Command</u>, <u>Leadership</u>, <u>and Management</u>: <u>Theory and Practice 1995-1996</u> (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army, 1995).

- U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, <u>Goldwater-Nichols</u>
 <u>Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986</u>, Report 99-824, 99th Congress, 2d Session, Washington, D.C.: U.S.
 Government Printing Office, 1986.
- U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, <u>Title 10</u>, <u>United States Code</u>. <u>Armed Forces</u>, 103d Congress, 1st Session (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, April 1993).
- U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Staff, <u>Joint Pub 3-0: Doctrine for Joint Operations</u>, (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, September 9, 1993).
- U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Staff, Joint Requirements Oversight Council, CINC Newsletter, Vol 1, No. 2, 16 Nov 1994; Vol 2, No. 1, 8 Mar 1995; Vol 2, No. 2, 31 Mar 1995 (Washington, DC: The Pentagon, 1994-1995).
- U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Staff, MCM-14-95: Charter of the Joint Requirements

 Oversight Council, (Washington, DC: The Pentagon, 7 February 1995).
- U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Staff, Memorandum of Policy No. 7, (1st Revision, March 17, 1993), Joint Strategic Planning System (Washington, DC: The Pentagon, 1993).